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JERRY R. DESMOND
TH E ATTEM PT T O REPEAL MAINE’S
PERSONAL LIBERTY LAWS
Many issues divided the nation before the Civil
War. One in particular involved the passage o f Per
sonal Liberty laws in the northern states, which circum
scribed the conduct of officials handlingfugitive slaves.
While Maine was not a prominent destination for
runaway slaves, its Personal Liberty laws, redrafted in
1857 by the state's new Republican majority, were
particularly forceful and therefore particularly odious
to Southern planters. As the secession crisis loomed,
Maine reconsidered the constitutionality of the laws
and their political expediency: Would the state bend to
the needs of national reconciliation? Mr. Desmond,
born in Island Falls, Maine, received M.A. degrees in
education (1979) and History (1991) from the Uni
versity o f Maine and taughtfo r twelve years in Maine
public schools. He has published several articles (N EW
ENGLAND QUARTERLY, TENNESSEE HISTORI
CAL Q U AR TE RLY, C H A T T A N O O G A R E 
GIONAL HISTO RICAL JOURNAL), and a book:
IM AGES OF AMERICA: CHATTANOOGA. A resi
dent of Lookout Mountain, Georgia he is currently
employed as Curator o f Collections for the Chatta
nooga Regional History Museum.

Following the election o f A braham Lincoln in I860, it
becam e evident to m oderates in b o th the Republican and
D em ocratic parties th at concessions to the South were necessary
to avoid secession an d civil war. O ne issue that seem ed prom is
ing in this reg ard was the possible repeal o f the various Personal
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The issue of how runaway slaves were to be handled in the North sparked a legal crisis
in the 1850s involving questions of propertv rights and personal libertv. The controversy
brought into question the federal Fugitive Slave Law, the Personal Libertv laws passed
by northern states, and indeed the Constitution itself. Solomon Northu/), TWELVE YEARS
A SLAVE (1853).

Liberty laws passed in the N orth d u rin g the 1850s. As a state
clearly controlled by the Republican party, dem onstrated by the
huge majority of votes given to Lincoln in the N ovem ber
election, M aine held the unique position o f having the o p p o rtu 
nity to send a message o f conciliation to the South bv repealing
its Personal Liberty laws. Instead, the state legislature, in concert
with the State Suprem e Judicial C ourt, tu rn ed its back on
com prom ise, voting to retain its the laws in the face o f the
possible destruction o f the U nion. T he seq u en ceo f events which
led to this decision are the subject o f this article.
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O ne o f the m ost troublesom e issues o f the 1850s was the
continuing p ro b lem o f runaway slaves. It is n o t possible to give
an exact total o f the n u m b er o f runaways in the decade p rio r to
the Civil W ar, b u t 1,000 a year is the m ost com m on estimate. In
1850, 1,011 runaways w ere reported; in 1860 the total tallied
803.1 If these two years w ere typical, which may n o t be true, it
w ould be possible to estim ate th at a total o f approxim ately 9,000
slaves ran away in the 1850s, from a total slave population o f
betw een 3.2 m illion in 1850 and 3.9 m illion in 1860. Thus an
estim ated .23 percent, o r 1 slave out o f 439, were runaways.
Certainly S ou th ern estim ates o f these num bers were greater.
J.F.H . C laiborne’s estim ate o f 100,000 in 1860 over the previous
fifty years rep resen ted obviously a guess.2
Regardless o f these totals, the idea that slaves were escaping
to the N o rth rankled the Southerners. They w anted those slaves
back, and thus n eed ed to establish procedures for their recovery.
In 1787, d u rin g the C onstitutional Convention, a com prom ise
on the fugitive slave question was reached and w ritten into
Article IV o f the C onstitution. W ithout actually m entioning the
w ord slavery, the article stated that “no perso n held to Service or
L ab o u r” who escapes to an o th er state shall be considered free
and m ust be ‘'delivered up on Claim o f the Party to w hom such
Service o r L abour may be d u e.” H erein lay the basic problem of
the fugitive slave question: ambiguity. If the founders had been
m ore specific in the phrasing of this section o f the C onstitution,
the next seventy-three years would have been less disputatious.
O nly a few carefully chosen words about who would enforce the
guarantees provided for in this section —the states or the federal
governm ent — were needed. If the wise m en in Philadelphia
in ten d ed that the m aster could recover his property by himself,
by his own m eans, they certainly did n o t explain this in the
C onstitution. As it was, six years later in 1793, Congress
attem p ted to define this section with the first Fugitive Slave Law.
T he 1793 law seem ed, on the surface, to provide definitive
answers to the questions o f p ro ced u re and jurisdiction. It
established un ifo rm extradition procedures betw een states, p ro 
vided a $500 fine for anyone who obstructed an owner, or his
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agent, o r concealed a runaway. Clearly it em pow ered the slave
ow ner o r his agent to “seize o r arrest such fugitive from labour,
and take him before a federal ju d g e w ithin the state, o r before
any m agistrate o f a county, city, o r town corporate w here the
seizure was m ad e.”:i After the ow ner proved to the satisfaction
o f the official th at the person was a runaway, the slave could be
retu rn ed and resto red to the owner.
H owever clear these procedures were, m any im p o rtan t
questions rem ained unansw ered. Could the state or local magis
trate refuse to provide assistance to the slave ow ner o r his agent?
W ould such an action be considered obstruction and, thus,
subject the official to a possible fine o f $500? W ere the state or
local officials req u ired to assist in locating and capturing the
alleged runaways? W ould the accused runaways be allowed to
speak at a hearing, provide for their own defense, subm it
evidence contrary to the charge, or have witnesses speak in their
behalf?
Obviously, S outherners believed that the ow ner had the
right to recapture his property or to have that property delivered
by professional agents. Many N ortherners, in contrast, believed
that they had the obligation to protect the rights of citizens —and
others —w ithin their state boundaries. Thus, in one o f the great
ironies o f the fugitive slave issue, the S outhern states, defenders
of states’ rights, yielded to the federal governm ent the pow er to
enforce the law — in fact, insisted that it do so. The N o rth ern
states, m ore inclined towards federalism, began to pass statutes,
know n as Personal Liberty laws, to p ro tect the states from federal
encroachm ent u p o n the rights o f their citizens.
n the early nin eteen th century New York and Pennsyl
vania took the lead in passing Personal Liberty laws
which restricted the state’s role in enforcing the Fugi
tive Slave Law o f 1793, including acts to prevent the kidnapping
o f free people o f color and certain guarantees o f due process.
Maine, after statehood in 1820, enacted several such laws,
including “An Act for the p rotection o f the Personal Liberty o f
the Citizens, an d for o th er p u rp o ses” in 1821, “An Act establish
ing the Rights to the W rit for replevying a p erso n ” in 1821, and

I
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“An Act against kidnapping o r selling for a slave” in 1838.4 By
the later date, m ost o f the N o rth ern states had som e sort o f
Personal Liberty law am ong their statutes. This fact, along with
an alarm ing increase in the n u m b er o f fugitive slaves and a
grow ing agitation by N o rth ern abolitionists, led the South to
challenge these laws in the federal courts.
In the m ost im p o rtan t o f these cases, Prigg v. Pennsylvania
(1842), a g ran d ju ry in Pennsylvania indicted Edward Prigg for
kidnapping certain alleged runaways in 1837. At issue was the
right o f a m aster "to reclaim and rem ove his property from a free
state w ithout a recourse to the courts.”5 The N o rth ern view held
th at the state h ad the right to grant aju ry trial, u n d er the laws o f
Pennsylvania, to the alleged runaways. The court decided
unanim ously th at the national governm ent had exclusive pow er
o f legislation u p o n the question o f fugitive slaves and that the
Pennsylvania law u p o n which Prigg had been indicted was
unconstitutional. O ne judge, Jo h n M cLean o f Ohio, while
concurring with the majority, w restled with two fundam ental
propositions: First, while adm itting that slaves were property,
Justice M cLean questioned the right o f a m aster to rem ove the
alleged runaw ay w ithout p ro o f o f right o r ow nership. “Is this n o t
an act which a state may prohibit?” he asked.6 Second, if the
ow ner’s claims were n o t just, how could his act o f force be
rem edied?
Events following Prigg could hardly have pleased the South.
M assachusetts, R hode Island, New H am pshire, O hio, New Jer*
sey, and V erm ont passed laws similar to the Pennsylvania law
declared unconstitutional by the Suprem e Court. Pennsylvania,
New York, and M aine refused to d ro p their Personal Liberty laws
from their statutes, justifying their nullification o f Suprem e
C o u rt edicts with talk o f “a higher law.” This issue, coupled with
the disputes over the expansion o f slavery into the new territories
won in war from Mexico and the p ro p o sed adm ittance of
C alifornia to statehood, led to the C om prom ise o f 1850 and a
new Fugitive Slave Law.
T he C om prom ise o f 1850 was in reality a very com plex
series o f m aneuverings in Congress. Both sides, as in m ost
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com prom ises, gave in on key issues in o rd er to reach an agree
m ent, and n eith er was com pletely happy with the outcom e. T he
Fugitive Slave Act o f 1850, as a section o f the seven-part com p ro 
mise, was w ritten from the S outhern viewpoint. This was done
to rew ard the South for relenting on the adm ittance o f California
as a free state and for agreeing to end the slave trade in
W ashington, D.C. The act had several controversial sections,
including a provision that allowed com m issioners to sum m on
the aid o f bystanders in catching runaways, a provision that
subjected those helping runaways to a $1,000 fine and a sixm o n th jail term , and a provision that disallowed the right o f the
alleged runaway to testify at hearings. Certainly, the m ost co n tro 
versial provision paid ten dollars to com m issioners who fo und in
favor o f the claim ant and only five dollars to those who fo und in
favor o f the alleged runaw ay.7
he howl that w ent up in the N orth following the
passage o f the Fugitive Slave Act has scarcely been
m atched in the country’s history, and never, except
perhaps during the actual secession o f S outhern states in 18601861, have so m any state governm ents ignored o r passed laws to
circum vent a federal statute. Only during Prohibition have so
many A m ericans purposely broken a law o f the country. In a
flurry o f activity, several N o rth ern states actually strengthened
their Personal Liberty laws. W isconsin went so far as to declare
the Fugitive Slave Act unconstitutional. Alm ost weekly, stories
of the “k idnapping” o f black m en and w om en or the “h ero ism ”
o f those who resisted the new law found their way into N o rth ern
newspapers. Shadrach Wilkins and A nthony Burns in Boston,
William H enry in Syracuse, Jo sh u a Glover in Milwaukee, and
Jo h n Price in O berlin were the m ore notable exam ples o f these.
W hile th ere were no such celebrated cases in Maine,
probably because the state was som ew hat off the track o f the
U n d erg ro u n d Railroad, the M aine legislature did strengthen its
Personal Liberty laws in 1855.8 T here can be no d o u b t th at these
revisions were in ten d ed to circum vent the Fugitive Slave Act o f
1850. Entitled “An Act F urther to P rotect Personal Liberty,” the
new statute p ro h ib ited judges, sheriffs, jailers, an d o th e r state

T
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The Compromise of 1850, introduced in the Senate by Kentuckian Henry Clay,
contained a series of resolutions designed to address sectional conflict, including a more
effective provision for returning fugitive slaves. In passing Personal Liberty laws, the
northern states seemed to be reneging on the compromises reached in 1850-compromises
in which the South had surrendered a great deal. E. .4. Duyckinck, NA TIONAL PORTRAIT
GALLERY OF EM IXEXT AMERICANS ( 1S62).

officials from assisting in the capture or detention o f alleged
runaway slaves o r g ranting certificates o f removal. T he fine for
such actions was up to $1,000 and a possible one year jail term .9
Federal marshals, however, could execute the provisions o f the
Fugitive Slave Act w ithout hindrance o r obstruction.
In 1857, d u rin g a general revision o f all o f the Maine
Statutes the Personal Liberty laws were rew ritten and strength
ened, m aking them am ong the most p o ten t in the country. No
retreat in the 1857 statutes occurred, and com ing as they did on
the heels o f the D red Scott decision in March 1857, there is little
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surprise in this fact. T he new provisions req u ired that the district
attorneys o f each county provide legal assistance in fugitive slave
cases, all costs to be paid by the state. Jail keepers in M aine were
n o t allowed to hold persons claim ed as fugitive slaves, and
m unicipal ju d g es w ere n o t allowed to hear fugitive slave cases.
T he M aine legislature, controlled by the new Republican m ajor
ity, overwhelmingly end o rsed these revisions.10
“The su rren d er o f a hum an being, ” the New York Evening
Post co m m ented bitterly, “who has exhibited his fitness for
freedom by en co u n terin g the dangers o f escaping from slavery,
is a m ost repulsive task.”11 In Maine, such a task would n o t be
p erfo rm ed w ithout first applying due process. A slave ow ner
w ould find it impossible to recover a runaway in Maine. His only
recourse was to em ploy the offices o f the federal m arshal in
Maine. The slave ow ner or his agent would be lucky to escape the
state u nharm ed, as the provisions o f the statute seem ed to imply
that Maine w ould n o t punish “affrayers, rioters, o r breakers o f
the peace” in any cases related to a fugitive slave.
To Southerners these statutes were clearly unconstitu
tional. M ore im portantly, however, it seem ed to the South that
the N o rth ern states were reneging on the com prom ises reached
in 1787 and the C om prom ise o f 1850 — com prom ises in which
the South had su rren d ered a great deal. If the N orth backed
away from these, it would certainly be read as an act o f nullifica
tion, endangering the Union; any talk o f S outhern secession
w ould only occur after the fact. A central cam paign issue o f the
election o f 1860 becam e the S outhern d em and that the Personal
Liberty laws in the N orth be repealed; Lincoln’s election seem ed
to en d all hopes o f effecting that repeal.
However, som e Republicans were disturbed by the charges
o f the unconstitutionality. Now that their candidate had been
elected and R epublican majorities established in Congress,
perhaps som e sort o f gesture towards the South w ould be in
order: if n o t repeal, as least a prom ise to look into the issue o f
constitutionality.
D em ocratic new spapers in Maine, o f course, insisted that
repeal should be the prim e option. A ppealing to “all conserva
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tive m en in the republican ranks, ” the editors o f the Eastern Argus
w rote in N ovem ber 1860: “T heir enactm ent was a d ep artu re
from national good faith, an d every State guilty o f it, is b o u n d in
h o n o r to repeal them and thus place themselves right before the
county.”12 T he Argus also gave a com pelling political reason for
repeal: “Such a course w ould have a decided effect to allay
excitem ent in the South and would very m uch strengthen Mr.
L incoln’s hands in m eeting the revolutionary m ovem ents.”13
T he Machais Union also called for repeal, stating that “a m ore
deliberate use o f nullification was never h eard of....Is there any
w onder that the South has com e to the conclusion that the
N o rth ern States are n o t friendly to them ?”14
N one of th e Republican jo u rn als in the state actually came
o u t in favor o f repeal. The three largest and m ost influential of
these, the B angor Whig and Courier, the KennebecJournal, and the
P o rtlan d Daily Advertiser, all violently opposed such a policy. “As
usual, the evil which the South is supposed to en d u re in conse
quence o f the existence o f personal liberty laws,” w rote the Daily
Advertiser editor, “have b een very m uch exaggerated.”15 W hen
p resen ted with the possibility that the repeal would help ease
tensions betw een the sections, the Whig and Courier editor asked
“if th ere be any perso n who thinks th at the repeal o f the personal
liberty laws by N o rth ern States would ‘satisfy the S outh’?”16 The
Kennebec Journal rem in d ed M aine citizens that the Personal
Liberty laws p ro tected the rights o f trial by ju ry and the writ of
H abeas C orpus. “Can Maine do less, and preserve h er hon o r?”17
O f all the R epublican journals, only the Ellsworth American
seem ed willing to consider a com prom ise on the issue, b u t one
unlikely to appeal to the South. “We would n o t hasten to repeal
the Personal Liberty Law, b u t if an arran g em en t [in which] the
h ard features o f the Fugitive Slave Act shall be softened down,
an d that arran g em en t should call for the repeal for o u r law, I
w ould do it at once, prom ptly and fully.”18
tate R epublican leaders state waited for w ord from
President-elect Lincoln before proceeding with ques
tions of constitutionality o r repeal. O n D ecem ber 20,
1860, Lincoln sent a set o f b rief resolutions on the issue, thro u g h

S
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T hurlow W eed, the alter ego o f William Seward, to H annibal
H am lin for his consideration. Lincoln w rote that the Fugitive
Slave Law should be enforced with certain “safeguards to lib
erty”; that all unconstitutional state laws should be repealed, and
th at the “Federal U nion m ust be preserved.”19 U nfortunately,
these words did little to help direct policy in Maine, for while
Lincoln show ed su p p o rt for the enforcem ent o f the Fugitive
Slave Law, he did n o t go all the way in calling for the repeal o f
personal liberty laws. H e only stated that any laws in conflict with
the Fugitive Slave Law, “if there be such,” should be repealed.
Lincoln, obviously a m an who choose his words carefully, led
som e in the party to believe that the laws were n o t to be repealed.
In M aine, U nion m eetings held in P ortland and Bangor
reviewed the situation. Several p ro m in en t Republicans, includin g jam es G. Blaine, William W. Thom as, and Jo h n Neal, called
for repeal.20 M ost Republicans, however, were reluctant to yield
to S outhern pressure. In his first address to the Maine legisla
ture, newly elected G overnor Israel W ashburn took the lead in
asking for a "candid exam ination o f the laws o f the State.” If the
legislature fo und "any provisions that are in violation o f the
federal C onstitution,” he pleaded, “there can be no d o u b t that
they ought to be repealed.”21 But he w arned the legislature, in
strong language, that to repeal laws that were constitutional —in
o rd er to m ake concessions — would “establish a p reced en t o f
incalculable m ischief and danger, through which w ould be
w rought, at no distant period, a practical subversion o f the
C onstitution, an d a transfer o f the governm ent from the hands
o f the many to the pow er o f the few.”22
O n February 13, 1861, Jam es G. Blaine, speaker o f the
M aine H ouse o f Representatives, requested th at the M aine
Suprem e Judicial C ourt review the state’s Personal Liberty laws
to d eterm ine th eir constitutionality. W ithin two weeks the eight
justices on the court retu rn ed their opinions to the legislature.
T he results, as shown in Table I, were mixed, as the eightjustices
p resen ted five different opinions.
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In laie December 1X60 President Lincoln sent word to Republic an state officials that the
Fugitive Slave Law should be enforced, with certain “safeguards lolibertv." Newly elected
Governor Israel Washburn asked the Maine legislature for a “candid examination” of
Maine’s Personal Libertv laws, but he cautioned against sacrificing them to Southern
demands. /.V MEMORIAM: ISRAEL WASHBURN J R . ( ISS4).

T he judges had no problem s with the constitutionality o f
requiring county attorneys to assist in the defense o f alleged
runaways (C hapter 79, Section 20) o r a similar m andate that
prohibited statejailers from receiving and keeping fugitive slaves
(C h ap ter 80, Section 37). By a majority o f five to three, the judges
also reaffirm ed the constitutionality o f prohibiting m unicipal
officials from taking cognizance o f fugitive slave cases o r aiding
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O PIN IO N S OF TH E EIG H T JUSTICES
OF TH E SUPREME JUDICIAL CO U RT OF TH E
STATE OF MAINE

Q uestion: A re the relevant sections rep u g n an t to the C on
stitution o f the U nited States, or in contravention o f any law
o f the U nited States m ade in pursuance thereof?
Justice

Ch 79: 20

Ch 80: 37 Ch 80: 53 Ch 132: 4

John Tenny

No

No

Yes

Yes

Jonas Cutting

No

No

Yes

Yes

Richard Rice

No

No

Yes

Yes

Seth May

No

No

Yes

No

Daniel Goodenow

No

No

Yes

No

John Appleton

No

No

No

No

Edward Kent

No

No

No

No

Woodbury Davis

No

No

No

No

Table I

in their arrest (C hapter 132, Section 4). Justices Tenny, Cutting,
and Rice were in the m inority in this. They p o in ted out, in a very
b rief opinion, that justices o f the peace in M aine would n o t have
jurisdiction over such a case anyway, b u t the section violated the
clause o f the Fugitive Slave Act th at req u ired “all good citizens”
to assist in such if their services were requested by a m arshal.
O f the fo u r Personal Liberty laws u n d er review, the statute
that p ro h ib ited state officials from “aiding” a m arshal in the
capture o f a fugitive slave was the strongest in p u rpose and
language (C hapter 80, Section 53). Five o f the justices felt that
this section was rep u g n an t to the C onstitution; o f the five,

205

MAINE’S PERSONAL LIBERTY LAWS

Justices May an d G oodenow expressed their displeasure with the
Fugitive Slave Act o f 1850:
We regret the existence of such provisions in the federal
constitution as constrain the highest judicial tribunal in the
nation to decide that such a statute, with all its harshness, is
constitutional...that a man or a woman and her posterity
may, in effect, be made slaves forever with less legal protec
tion and ceremony then is permitted under our state laws to
establish title to the smallest article of property.23

Justices A ppleton and K ent com bined to write the longest of the
five opinions, ru n n in g fo u rteen pages. (However, over twothirds o f their opinion reviewed the history o f the issue.) They
did n o t find the statute to be rep u g n an t to the C onstitution,
w riting th at it should be held to be so only if “shifting uses’7of
som e words — if state officers could be in terp reted to be acting
as private citizens, for exam ple —were allowed.
Justice Davis gave the m ost rem arkable opinion o f the three
dissenters. Jo in in g A ppleton and K ent in their assessm ent o f this
statute, Davis w ent fu rth er than any o f the judges in expressing
his ab h o rren ce with the Fugitive Slave Act and with slavery.
I assume that every man is presumed to be free, and that
slavery nowhere exists except by positive provisions of
statute. The law of slavery is therefore bounded by the
territorial jurisdiction of the state governments by which it
is established. If the master voluntarily carries a slave into a
free state, or permits him to go there, the slave thereby
becomes free.
It follows, that, if a slave escapes into a free state, without
the consent of the master, he also thereby becomes free
while remaining there, and the master has no right to
recapture him, unless there is some provision in the Consti
tution of the United States for that purpose.24

Davis th en launched an attack on Article IV, section two,
p arag rap h three, o f the U nited States C onstitution. As the article
did n o t m en tio n slavery specifically it m ust be assum ed, said
Davis, th at it applied to free persons. H e opined:
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It does not describe a slave. A slave is not held to service or
labor under the laws of a slave state. Those laws make him
an article of property, to be bought and sold, like other
chattels. And though it is said, and I have no doubt truly, that
the framers of the constitution meant to apply this language
to slaves, they did not use language that could properly be
applied to slaves. There was no inadvertence, or mistake.
They meant to use language that could not be applied to
slaves, because they believed that slavery was speedily to be
abolished.25

It followed from this line o f argum ent that since the
C onstitution makes no m ention o f slaves o r slavery, the laws that
p ro tected that institution were unconstitutional. W hile clearly
overstepping his bounds here, Davis recognized that the Su
prem e C ourt in Prigg had decided that the Fugitive Slave laws did
n o t violate the C onstitution. In m ost com pelling language, he
declared it was his duty to speak against them . “N o w eight o f
authority, and no lapse o f time, can establish th at which is wrong,
or prevent it from ultimately being overthrow n.”26
y the first week in M arch 1861, the Fortieth Legisla
ture was ready to take action, based on the opinions
o f the court. M otions to repeal the Personal Liberty
laws were m ade in b o th the Senate and the H ouse o f R epresen
tatives, although some m em bers attem p ted to delay an actual
vote hoping th at the session would end. T he Senate voted to
repeal by a vote o f seventeen to ten. T he H ouse vote p ro d u ced
excitm ent, as Speaker Blaine came down from his chair to plead
for repeal. However, in a speech thought by m any to be the finest
of the session, R epresentative William H. McCrillis o f Bangor
spoke for over an h o u r against the m otion to repeal.27 The final
vote tallied forty-seven in favor — including all the D em ocrats
presen t — and sixty-seven opposed.28
The split in the Maine Legislature reflects the fact that
the issue h ad lost m uch o f its partisan steam. At the tim e the
legislature was voting, seven southern states had already seceded
from the U nion; A braham Lincoln was th ree days short o f taking
the oath o f office, and sixty-eight federal troops in a small
pentagonal brick fo rt on an island near the m o u th of C harleston
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James G. Blaine. Speaker of the Maine I louse, requested a judicial review of the Personal
Liberty laws, and in March 1N61 the Speaker pleaded before the legislature for their
repeal. A House vote of 47 to 67 allowed them to stand. The split among Republicans
reflected the crisis at hand: Already seven southern states had seceded, and South
Carolina shore batteries were besieging the federal troops at Fort Sumter. Wil/n FIricher
Johnson. LIFE OFJAMES G. E IA IN E ( 1S93).

H arbor were about to ru n out o f supplies. The country had
tu rn ed away from the issue o f Personal Liberty laws to confront
the greater issues o f secession and arm ed conflict. T he laws were
retained in the M aine Statutes until the passage o f the T h irteen th
am en d m en t to the U nited States C onstitution m ade them red u n 
dant.
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